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ENFORCING AN UNENFORCEABLE LAW: THE NATIONAL
BIOENGINEERED FOOD DISCLOSURE STANDARD
ABSTRACT
Congress hastily crafted the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure
Standard (“GE labeling law” or Act), which it passed in July of 2016, to
preempt various state laws that were cropping up around the country seeking
to label genetically engineered ingredients (GEs). This Comment anticipates
that the Act will face free speech challenges that may find the GE labeling law
unconstitutional, especially following recent trends in First Amendment
jurisprudence that have been increasingly applying stricter scrutiny upon
constitutional review. Due to inconsistent applications of the two governing
tests that review compelled commercial speech—the Central Hudson and
Zauderer standards, respectively—this Comment suggests that the Supreme
Court, in the context of the GE labeling law, determine the appropriate
scrutiny level that courts should apply when reviewing First Amendment cases
involving compelled commercial speech. This Comment finds that the GE
labeling law will not likely withstand scrutiny under Central Hudson, but
should survive less stringent review under Zauderer.
If the GE labeling law passes First Amendment review, the Act’s weak
enforcement provisions will invite a wave of litigation. This litigation will
likely come from two sources: (1) consumer lawsuits and (2) competitor
lawsuits arising under the Lanham Act. This Comment concludes that if the
law survives First Amendment review, policing via private litigation will be a
necessary complement to federal enforcement. Specifically, this Comment
argues that competitor lawsuits under the Lanham Act will be the most
effective enforcement tool, and their utility may be applicable to enforcing
other laws.
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INTRODUCTION
The National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (“GE labeling law”
or Act) will likely face litigation. An overview of the pro- and anti-labeling
arguments that will give rise to litigation will help contextualize future suits.
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are not new to the marketplace,
but consumer frenzy about labeling them is.1 The infamous war against GMOs
is spurred, in part, by an aversion to a misnomer; consumers are not actually
afraid of every GMO, but they have conflated their fear of genetically
engineered (GE) ingredients with all GMOs.2 The true labeling clash involves
whether to disclose the presence of GE ingredients. Labeling advocates—
supporting transparency and a consumer’s right to know—are pitted against
labeling opponents—many from the food industry—who defend that GE
ingredients pose no real “health, safety, or nutritional risks.”3
In the absence of a national regulatory scheme, various states passed GE
labeling laws,4 which were largely galvanized by consumer demand.5 The
pioneer state labeling law was to take effect in Vermont on July 1, 2016.6 In
response, Congress raced to pass the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure
Standard, which President Barack Obama signed into law on July 29, 2016.7
With the Act, the United States now joins sixty-four other countries that
1
See generally Aamena Ahmed, The Push to Label Genetically Modified Products, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/us/the-push-to-label-genetically-modified-products.html.
2
See Ryan Haas, Food for Thought: The Difference Between GMO and GE Foods, OR. PUB.
BROADCASTING (Oct. 2, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.opb.org/news/blog/newsblog/food-for-thought-thedifference-between-gmo-and-ge-foods/ (last updated Feb. 18, 2015).
3
162 CONG. REC. S1475 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell). Both the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration, “the two agencies charged with ensuring
the safety and delivery of our Nation’s food supply,” support that bioengineered crops are safe for consumers.
Id.
4
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-92c (West 2015) (effective July 1, 2015 pending adoption of
similar laws in other Northeast states); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2593 (Supp. 2016) (effective August 1,
2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3043 (West Supp. 2016).
5
See Molly Ball, Want to Know if Your Food Is Genetically Modified?, ATLANTIC (May 14, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/want-to-know-if-your-food-is-genetically-modified/
370812/ (stating that labeling was hardly on politicians’ “radar until a massive amount of constituent pressure
put it there”).
6
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3043.
7
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1639, 1639a–c, 1639i–j, 6524 (Supp.
2018). In fact, the House of Representatives had passed its own voluntary GE labeling bill, the Safe and
Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015, but due to “the time constraint imposed by the Vermont law, the House
and Senate [were] unable to conference the two bills.” 162 CONG. REC. H4934 (daily ed. July 14, 2016)
(statement of Rep. Conaway). Thus, Congress passed the bill although it “didn’t have time to debate these
issues and hear expert testimony. The U.S. Senate did not have one single hearing so that any of those 325
million Americans could be heard.” 162 CONG. REC. S4850 (daily ed. July 7, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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require GE labeling standards.8 As Gary Hirshberg, founder of the labeling
advocacy group Just Label It, told the New York Times upon passage of the
law, “What today really means is that we’ve left the legislative period of this
battle after seven years and moved into the regulatory and marketplace phase
of it, which was where it was always headed anyway.”9
The federal GE labeling law involves a mandatory disclosure, which
necessarily implicates First Amendment free speech issues. This Comment
argues that, should the statute come before it, the Supreme Court should revisit
the two controlling tests that govern the scrutiny levels for mandatory
disclosures such as the GE labeling law. The Central Hudson test, which
emerged from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, requires intermediate scrutiny;10 the Zauderer test, which arose
from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, demands a reasonable
relationship between the mandatory disclosure and the government interest.11
While the two standards may seem distinct, in practice, however, the Zauderer
standard often resembles intermediate scrutiny. A growing yet undefined trend
toward stricter scrutiny has materialized for two reasons. First, litigants
challenging compelled disclosures have been urging more stringent standards.
And second, in addition, or as a result, courts have been applying higher
scrutiny levels, which require more substantial government interests to justify
infringements on free speech, especially in the context of public health.12
The two tests are antiquated—they emerged in 198013 and 1985,14
respectively—and recent First Amendment cases have commingled their
applications, unsettling and blurring the standards.15 In light of the rattled
standards and the fact the Supreme Court has yet to consider mandatory

8
International Labeling Laws, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/
976/ge-food-labeling/international-labeling-laws# (last visited Dec. 26, 2017). Countries with mandatory GE
labeling regulations include “member nations of the European Union, Russia, China, Brazil, Australia, Turkey
and South Africa.” Id. Indeed, as Senator Tester remarked, even “places you would never ever think of as
having transparency . . . require GMO labeling.” 162 CONG. REC. S4787 (daily ed. July 6, 2016) (statement of
Sen. Tester).
9
Stephanie Strom, G.M.O. Labeling Bill Gains House Approval, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/business/gmo-labeling-bill-gains-house-approval.html.
10
447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
11
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
12
See Samantha Rauer, Note, When the First Amendment and Public Health Collide: The Court’s
Increasingly Strict Constitutional Scrutiny of Health Regulations That Restrict Commercial Speech, 38 AM.
J.L. & MED. 690, 691–92 (2012).
13
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
14
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626.
15
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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disclosures in the health context, the GE labeling law would be an opportune
occasion to define clearly the appropriate level of scrutiny for compelled
commercial disclosures as well as the types of government interests that would
satisfy both intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson or the more relaxed
standard under Zauderer. Indeed, Justices Ginsburg and Thomas have
expressed interest in reassessing the Zauderer standard.16 More specifically,
the Supreme Court should clarify whether the Zauderer standard requires a
substantial government interest.
If the GE labeling law withstands likely First Amendment challenges, or
until successful First Amendment litigation overturns the law, the government
should anticipate two other sources of litigation: (1) consumer class actions
arising under parallel state laws or existing state consumer protection laws and
(2) competitor suits by manufacturers seeking to enforce the GE labeling law
through the Lanham Act. This Comment forecasts that private litigation will be
necessary to enforce the GE labeling law due to the ineffective enforcement
provisions in the language of the Act. In particular, this Comment concludes
that competitor suits under the Lanham Act will likely be the most powerful
instrument to enforce the Act.
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the debate
surrounding GE foods that incited Congress to enact the National
Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard with the aim of preempting a
patchwork of disparate state laws across the country. Part II analyzes the
language of the Act, exposing the weaknesses in the GE labeling law that will
give rise to the litigation discussed in Parts III and IV. Part III explores the
likely First Amendment challenges that GE labeling opponents will raise in
response to compelled commercial speech from the mandatory disclosure
requirement. Finally, if the Act survives the free speech issues discussed in
Part III, Part IV concludes that private litigation will be necessary to enforce
the GE labeling law due to weak enforcement provisions in the Act. This
Comment ultimately concludes that private enforcement via competitor suits
will be the most effective enforcement tool.

16
Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 153 (2016) (citing Borgner v. Fla. Bd. of
Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
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GMOS VS. GES: TERMINOLOGY AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT
THE GE LABELING LAW

This Part describes the development of genetically engineered food and its
ubiquity in the American and global food supply. This background sets the
stage for the debate over GE labeling that spurred the passage of the federal
GE labeling law.
Through hybrid and selective breeding, “[h]umans have been modifying
crops for thousands of years.”17 In fact, much of the food on our plates today
would bear little resemblance to their look, taste, and texture from decades ago
because the majority of our cultivated crops are genetically altered.18 For
instance, commercially available garden strawberries are a hybrid between a
species native to North America and a species native to South America,19 but
these strawberries are not considered to contain GMOs. As a result of
traditional genetic modification through hybridization, our modern diets are
comprised of varied plant-based foods. But unlike hybridization, genetic
engineering may introduce genes from other unrelated species into a plant to
create desired traits, such as splicing fish genes into tomato DNA to make
them more frost-resistant.20 Although GE tomatoes are not currently sold in
supermarkets, “Frankentomatoes” like the one just described became “an
unofficial emblem of the anti-GMO movement.”21
An introduction to relevant scientific terminology should help clarify and
contextualize some of the tensions that may arise in both pro- and anti-labeling
arguments. “Genetic modification” is a broad term that may encompass any
genotype alteration of a plant, whether via new or traditional techniques.22 On
balance, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) uses the term “genetic
engineering” in reference to the scientific process of making “targeted changes
to a plant’s genetic makeup to give the plant a new desirable trait.”23 GE foods
are often produced through recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA)
17
Consumer Info About Food from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/GEPlants/ucm461805.htm (last updated Oct. 19,
2015) [hereinafter Consumer Info About GE Food].
18
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 n.3 (May 29,
1992).
19
Consumer Info About GE Food, supra note 17.
20
Jeffrey Smith, Throwing Biotech Lies at Tomatoes – Part 1: Killer Tomatoes, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 31, 2010, 9:29 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-smith/throwing-biotech-lies-at_b_803139.
html.
21
Id.
22
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,984 n.3.
23
Consumer Info About GE Food, supra note 17.
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techniques, which “involve the isolation and subsequent introduction of
discrete DNA segments containing the gene(s) of interest into recipient (host)
plants.”24 Although GE techniques may also produce GMOs, FDA’s
longstanding position is that the term “genetic engineering” is more precise.25
For clarity, this Comment adopts the terminology of FDA unless directly
quoting or referring to the terminology used in another source.
GE techniques strive to cultivate plants with improved flavor and
nutritional profiles, higher crop yields, and extended freshness that can better
survive pest damage and plant diseases.26 These methods produce innovations
such as reducing enzyme levels to resist browning from cuts and bruises on
apples.27
Foods created through GE were first introduced to our food supply in the
1990s.28 Since 1992, FDA has taken the position that GE foods do not require
additional labeling, reasoning that GE foods do not “differ from other foods in
any meaningful or uniform way” and that they do not “present any different or
greater safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding.”29
However, FDA has not deemed GE foods as “generally recognized as safe”
(GRAS), but has rather announced a GRAS presumption until proven
otherwise.30 Amidst the labeling craze, FDA issued information to consumers
regarding GE crops, affirming that “[c]redible evidence has demonstrated that
foods from the GE plant varieties marketed to date are as safe as comparable,
non-GE foods.”31 FDA still upholds that “the key factors in reviewing safety
concerns should be the characteristics of the food product, rather than the fact
that the new methods are used.”32 In sum, FDA maintains that products
containing GE ingredients do not require special labeling.
Today, GE crops abound in the American food supply. A 2015 Guidance
Document published by FDA included statistics about the prevalence of GE

24

Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,986.
Consumer Info About GE Food, supra note 17.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,991.
30
Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172 (D.D.C. 2000). “This presumption of
safety is rebuttable, because FDA will ‘require food additive petitions in cases where safety questions exist
sufficient to warrant formal premarket review by FDA to ensure public health protection.’” Id. at 172 (quoting
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,990).
31
Consumer Info About GE Food, supra note 17.
32
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,984–85.
25
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foods.33 Measuring by acreage of planted crops in the 2013 crop year, GE
soybeans made up 93% of planted soybeans, GE cotton made up 90% of
planted cotton, and GE corn made up 90% of planted corn.34 In the 2009 to
2010 crop year, GE sugar beets accounted for 95% of planted sugar beets.35
Also common in the marketplace are GE varieties of “potatoes, squash, apples,
and papayas.”36 To be sure, GE products are part of our everyday diet, and the
forthcoming GE label will appear on many items that frequent our shopping
carts.
II. THE NATIONAL BIOENGINEERED FOOD DISCLOSURE STANDARD: ITS
GENESIS AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE ACT
On July 14, 2016, the House of Representatives approved the Senate bill to
pass the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard,37 which President
Barack Obama signed into law on July 29, 2016.38 The legislation amends the
Agriculture Marketing Act of 1946,39 which established an integrative and
scientific approach to distribution and marketing of agricultural products.40
The media have predicted that the foregoing GE labeling debate will end
up in courts,41 and politicians echo this outlook.42 An analysis of the federal
GE labeling bill will affirm these forecasts by the media and politicians. This
Part analyzes the inception, components, and language of the Act. The analysis
also identifies areas that may be susceptible to litigation: namely, the weak
enforcement provision that will be the source of necessary private litigation to
ensure compliance with the Act. In addition, relevant parts of the
Congressional Record expound upon these shortcomings, buttressing the idea
that the Act will be challenged in court.

33
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY LABELING INDICATING
WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DERIVED FROM GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS (2015).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Consumer Info About GE, supra note 17.
37
Actions Overview S.764 — 114th Congress (2015-2016), CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/senate-bill/764/actions (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
38
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1639, 1639a–c, 1639i–j, 6524 (Supp.
2018).
39
Id. The provisions regarding GE labeling appear as the National Bioengineered Food Labeling
Disclosure Standard in subchapter V and the Labeling of Certain Food in subchapter VI. Id.
40
7 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012).
41
See Strom, supra note 9.
42
Id. Senator Richard Blumenthal stated, “A court interpreting the issues that will be raised in
litigation—and there’s no question that there will be litigation—will look first and probably only to the
language of the statute.” Id.
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A. Definition of “Bioengineering”
The Act defines the term “bioengineering” in food as a product “that
contains genetic material that has been modified through in vitro recombinant
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) techniques” and a food “for which the
modification could not otherwise be obtained through conventional breeding or
found in nature.”43
In reaction to the bill’s definition section, FDA has commented that the
scope of the term “bioengineering” is too narrow because “contains genetic
material” does not accurately reflect whether the product was originally
derived from any GE ingredients.44 Accordingly, the Act’s interpretation of
GEs would, in effect, leave several food products outside the purview of the
labeling law even though they may be derived from GE materials. For
example, refined “oil made from GE soy would not have any genetic material
in it,” and could thus be exempt from product labeling.45 In addition, FDA
pointed out that “[i]t may be difficult to demonstrate that a particular
modification could not be obtained through conventional breeding (or even
that it could not occur in nature).”46 Reflecting on this interpretation, Senator
Patrick Leahy from Vermont remarked, “This raises more red flags because
many of the genes that have been modified or introduced do occur in nature,
just not in the particular crop the gene has been added to. They might occur
naturally . . . .”47
Identifying further ambiguity in the language, FDA has questioned whether
the modification must result from the “effect of the rDNA construct or the
location of the genome” because “the former could arguably be obtained via
conventional breeding, whereas the latter cannot.”48 Many GE breeding
techniques aim to mimic results that may also arise from traditional breeding
techniques; however, the GE process is more precise because it has the
capacity to isolate and control a single cell, whereas traditional methods may

43
7 U.S.C. § 1639(1). To be sure, varying interpretations of the definitions in the GE labeling bill may
be the basis of future consumer lawsuits concerning misleading labels, which this Comment discusses in
section IV.A.
44
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EDW16734, FDA/HHS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON SENATE
AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE DRAFT LEGISLATION TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL DISCLOSURE STANDARD FOR
BIOENGINEERED FOODS (2016).
45
Id.; see also 162 CONG. REC. S4787 (daily ed. July 6, 2016) (statement of Sen. Tester) (“That means
Roundup Ready soybeans, corn, could ultimately be excluded from labeling of the GMO QR code.”).
46
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 44.
47
162 CONG. REC. S4845 (daily ed. July 7, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
48
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 44.
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inadvertently introduce undesirable traits into the plant.49 Because GE labeling
focuses on process rather than the product’s contents, this gap may be
misleading if the final product is derived from GE materials, yet the product
bears no label identifying that the contents are, indeed, GE. Consequently, the
term “bioengineering” may prove to be false or misleading, especially because
genetic engineering has already been the subject of many consumer class
actions.50 These lawsuits will likely continue after the mandatory disclosure
regulations are implemented.
B. Establishment of the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard
Before the law is implemented, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) has two years from July 29, 2016 to establish the GE
disclosure method that manufacturers must include in their product labeling.51
The legislative history of the bill criticizes that the delegation of authority to
USDA has nebulous parameters, which provide little guidance for
implementation of the law.52 However, this inherent ambiguity may be
advantageous in that it could grant USDA latitude to establish implementation
regulations that may reflect the goals of both the House of Representatives and
the Senate that they did not have time to write into the law.53 In addition, as
long as USDA adopts a reasonable interpretation of the bill, courts must, under
current law, defer to their interpretations under Chevron deference.54

49

Consumer Info About GE Food, supra note 17.
E.g., Behrend, Behrend, & Knittel Farms v. Monsanto Co., No. 4:13-cv-00250-BLW, 2013 WL
4711730 (D. Idaho Aug. 30, 2013); see also Carey Gillam, Monsanto Settles Farmer Lawsuits over
Experimental GMO Wheat, REUTERS, Nov. 12, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-monsanto-wheat/
monsanto-settles-farmer-lawsuits-over-experimental-gmo-wheat-idUSL2N0T22O820141112; Nate Raymond,
Syngenta Agrees to Settle U.S. Farmer Lawsuits over GMO Corn, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syngenta-ag-settlement/syngenta-agrees-to-settle-u-s-farmer-lawsuits-overgmo-corn-idUSKCN1C12K8.
51
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1639, 1639b(a) (Supp. 2018).
Although FDA has taken the stance for the past twenty years that GE products do not require additional
labeling, FDA criticized the fact that the bill gives USDA the “authorities over food labeling that [are]
otherwise under FDA’s sole regulatory jurisdiction.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 44. However,
USDA was also the federal agency tasked with implementing the National Organic Program, Organic Foods
Production Act of 1990, so the agency’s task to develop the GE disclosure is not arbitrary. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501,
6503 (2012).
52
See 162 CONG. REC. H4935 (daily ed. July 14, 2016) (statement of Rep. Newhouse). For example,
Representative Newhouse stated the bill “is filled with ambiguous statements and, in many places, offers little
guidance to USDA on how to best implement the bill’s provisions.” Id.
53
162 CONG. REC. H4934 (daily ed. July 14, 2016) (statement of Rep. Conway) (stating that due to the
“time constraint imposed by the Vermont law, the House and Senate will be unable to conference the two
bills”).
54
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
50
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In the language of the bill, Congress suggests three potential disclosure
options to USDA: (1) a text, (2) a symbol, or (3) an electronic or digital link,
such as a Quick Response (QR) code.55 Accompanying a QR code, a
manufacturer must provide language such as, “Scan here for more food
information.”56 This mandatory language is, in fact, one word longer than the
phrase: “Made with genetically engineered ingredients,” which is the sort of
plain language that many right-to-know supporters, state labeling laws, and
other countries advocate.57
Part of USDA’s task under § 1639b(c)(1) of the Act was to “conduct a
study to identify potential technological challenges that may impact whether
consumers would have access to the bioengineering disclosure through
electronic or digital disclosure methods.”58 USDA published the results of its
study in July 2017, finding that there are, indeed, technological challenges for
all of the study’s participants, but the agency is confident “these challenges can
be overcome through appropriate implementation of the [l]aw.”59
USDA still has time to formulate the implementation regulations, including
the mandatory disclosure format. Because agency action at this point is merely
speculative, this Comment focuses on the litigation that will likely arise
notwithstanding the type of disclosure USDA ultimately implements.60

55
7 U.S.C. § 1639b(b)(2)(D). A QR code is “a digital code [that] requires a smart phone or other
scanning device to decipher. Those who do not have access to a smart phone—more than 50% of rural and
[low-income] populations, and more than 65% of the elderly—will have to rely upon scanners provided by
another party to access information about GMO content.” 162 CONG. REC. S4848 (daily ed. July 7, 2016)
(statement of Sen. Leahy).
56
7 U.S.C. § 1639b(d)(1)(A).
57
See, e.g., Vt. Consumer Protection R. § 121.02 (2016) (implementing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3043
(West Supp. 2016) by requiring both packaged and unpackaged raw or processed food to have “a clear and
conspicuous disclosure reading ‘Produced with Genetic Engineering,’ ‘Partially Produced with Genetic
Engineering,’ or ‘May be Produced with Genetic Engineering’”); 162 CONG. REC. H4935 (daily ed. July 14,
2016) (statement of Rep. Pingree) (“The solution is simple: list GMO ingredients on the back of the package in
the ingredient list in plain English. . . . [Other countries] require a simple, on-package label that anyone can
read.”).
58
7 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(1).
59
DELOITTE, STUDY OF ELECTRONIC OR DIGITAL LINK DISCLOSURE: A THIRD-PARTY EVALUATION OF
CHALLENGES IMPACTING ACCESS TO BIOENGINEERED FOOD DISCLOSURE 4 (2017). As anticipated, these
challenges are particularly acute for rural shoppers and retailers, who may not have the technology to access
the digital disclosure. Id. at 5.
60
For more information regarding USDA’s current stance on the GE labeling law and the agency’s
interpretation of its role, see 162 CONG. REC. S4846 (daily ed. July 7, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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C. Federal Preemption of State Food-Labeling Standards
Because one of the primary goals of the Act was to preempt the Vermont
and other state-law bills, the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard
expressly preempts these laws.61 Accordingly, federal preemption over state
laws should not be an issue in courts.62
D. The Enforcement Provision
Weak federal enforcement beseeches enforcement from other sources.
Here, the enforcement provision of the legislation is essentially empty,63 which
may transfer the burden of enforcement to private parties through consumer
and competitor litigation. In fact, the enforcement provision delegates
enforcement—explicitly and implicitly—to outside entities.
Explicitly, the Act suggests that states may enact parallel labeling laws that
can provide independent enforcement authority.64 These independent state GE
labeling laws must be “identical to the mandatory disclosure requirement.”65 In
short, states will “enforce it on behalf of USDA” if they enact their own
parallel state laws.66 Irony aside, the very same federal law that was enacted to
thwart fifty patchwork state laws explicitly recommends that the states
independently adopt their own versions, albeit they must be coextensive with
the federal Act. What may be troubling is that if some states choose not to
enact a parallel provision, then the states that do would likely bear the brunt of
the enforcement responsibility and burden.
Implicitly, the enforcement provision invites outside enforcement because
it is inherently inefficient. Although the enforcement section expressly states
that it is “a prohibited act for a person to knowingly fail to make a
disclosure,”67 this warning lacks grit. First, the Act specifically precludes
USDA from any recall authority, 68 which is a common enforcement action by
61
7 U.S.C. § 1639i(b). The legislative history confirms on several occasions that the “legislation is
needed to avoid a situation where 50 [s]tates set up 50 different labels, which would only create confusion for
consumers, farmers, and food companies.” 162 CONG. REC. H4935 (daily ed. July 14, 2016) (statement of Rep.
Peterson).
62
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
63
7 U.S.C. § 1639b(g).
64
Id. § 1639b(e).
65
Id.
66
162 CONG. REC. S4846 (daily ed. July 7, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see 7 U.S.C. § 1639b(e).
67
7 U.S.C. § 1639b(g)(1).
68
Id. § 1639b(g)(4). The bill states: “[USDA] shall have no authority to recall any food subject to this
subtitle.” Id.
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FDA and USDA in other areas;69 and second, the Act does not contain civil
penalties. The legislative history condemns both of these omissions by
criticizing that the Act does not afford USDA authority to recall products and
that it is “void of any fines or punishments for violators, and there is no
compliance deadline for companies.”70
The Act is unclear as to whether FDA may retain its independent recall
enforcement authority; however, the bill states: “Nothing in this
subtitle . . . creates any rights or obligations for any person under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . . . .”71 This may be construed as Congress
declining to grant FDA additional authority outside the purview of its current
misbranding authority.72
As seen in the language of the Act, there are several weaknesses that invite
litigation. In light of the fact that USDA has yet to formulate the
implementation regulations of the GE labeling bill, and because the disclosure
format is still being considered and developed,73 this Comment focuses on the
litigation that will likely arise from the GE labeling law, as predicted by the
media and Congress.74 Accordingly, private litigation will be key to effective
enforcement if the law survives First Amendment challenges. However, a
threshold issue to address before discussing enforcement problems is the
likelihood of First Amendment challenges to the GE labeling bill.
III. LIKELIHOOD OF OVERCOMING FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
This Part examines likely First Amendment legal challenges in response to
the mandatory GE disclosure. If First Amendment objections declare the law
unconstitutional, then the other shortcomings in the law—specifically, the lack
of effective enforcement—may become obsolete issues. However, even if First
Amendment challenges successfully result in deeming the law
69
Id. § 1633 (granting USDA recall authority); 21 U.S.C. § 350l (2012) (granting FDA recall
authority); see also 9 C.F.R. § 418 (2018) (granting USDA recall authority of meat and poultry).
70
162 CONG. REC. S4846 (daily ed. July 7, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy). By contrast, the Vermont
labeling bill, for example, would have allowed for civil penalties of up to “$1,000 per day . . . per each
uniquely named, designated, or marketed product.” Vt. Consumer Protection R. § 121.04(e)(i) (2016).
71
7 U.S.C. § 1639c(b).
72
21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2012).
73
On June 28, 2017, USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service released a thirty-question questionnaire
to gather input from “interested parties to comment on the proposed rule during the rulemaking process” with
the aim of releasing a final rule by July of 2018. Proposed Rule Questions Under Consideration, U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC.: AGRIC. MARKETING SERV., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/gmo-questions (last visited
Jan. 10, 2018).
74
See Strom, supra note 9.
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unconstitutional, this litigation may take time, and the enforcement matters
will remain pertinent until the law is overturned.
First Amendment challenges are likely because compelled commercial
disclosures, such as a mandatory GE label, have previously faced litigation.75
Mandatory disclosures have become increasingly common to regulate
information, often implemented in the interests of consumer protection,
including public health.76 This type of information regulation is considered a
“lighter-touch” governance rather than direct regulation, allowing a more
flexible form of regulation by arming consumers with information.77 Although
the public may view these labels as “choice affirming,” they still implicate
First Amendment concerns78 as they compel speech through words or pictures.
Indeed, paternalistic guidance through mandatory disclosures “strikes closer to
the core of the First Amendment’s animating rationales than do mandates or
bans on conduct.”79
Indeed, a challenge to a mandatory GE label has already reached courts in
response to the now-defunct Vermont GE labeling bill.80 Correspondingly,
First Amendment challenges to the Act will mimic the lawsuit initiated by a
consortium of food industry trade associations—including the Grocery
Manufacturers of America, Snack Food Association, and International Dairy
Foods Association—that challenged infringements on First Amendment rights
after the passage of the Vermont GE labeling law.81 In Grocery
Manufacturer’s Ass’n v. Sorrell (GMA v. Sorrell), the District Court of
Vermont upheld the constitutionality of the Vermont labeling law; 82 however,
this outcome will not necessarily predict future First Amendment challenges to
the federal GE labeling law given that recent First Amendment jurisprudence

75

See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996).
See Shanor, supra note 16, at 166.
77
See id. at 171.
78
See id. at 135, 172, 174. Mandatory disclosures are considered “lighter-touch regulation” because
they “enhance the public’s power of choice by eschewing the sometimes costly, inefficient, and heavy-handed
burden of direction regulation of behavior.” Id. at 167.
79
Id. at 172.
80
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 621 (D. Vt. 2015).
81
Id. Manufacturers that opposed the Vermont law, and supported plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the bill, included Coca-Cola Co., PepsiCo, Inc., General Mills, ConAgra Foods, Inc., and
Kraft Foods Group, Inc. Id. at 599.
82
In GMA v. Sorrell, the Vermont District Court “recognized that that there are ‘material differences
between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech,’” and overturned the plaintiffs’ petition
for an injunction to enjoin the law. Id. at 621, 648 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985)).
76
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involving commercial speech, including the appropriate level of scrutiny a
reviewing court should apply, is “elusive.”83
In addition, current First Amendment challenges have proven to be “a
powerful deregulatory engine.”84 These challenges have been especially
successful in the commercial speech context.85 Plaintiffs initiating First
Amendment claims have been pushing courts to apply stronger scrutiny
levels,86 and stricter review makes it more difficult for laws to pass
constitutional muster. Given the murkiness enveloping the questions of which
level of scrutiny to apply and what government interests will be satisfactory to
meet the government’s burden, the GE labeling law’s chances of survival are
indefinite.

A. How Mandatory Commercial Disclosures Fit Within the First Amendment
Context and Current Free Speech Jurisprudence
An overview of the First Amendment interests involving compelled
commercial disclosures will help anticipate the controversies that will likely
crop up from the GE labeling law. The First Amendment prohibits laws that
restrict the freedom of speech,87 and “protects ‘both the right to speak freely
and the right to refrain from speaking at all.’”88 However, “the degree of
protection afforded by the First Amendment depends on whether the activity
sought to be regulated constitutes commercial or non-commercial speech”89
because commercial speech receives less constitutional protection than
noncommercial speech.90 The doctrine of commercial speech is a relatively
recent development, first recognized by the Supreme Court in the mid-1970s in
83
84
85
86
87
88

Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
Shanor, supra note 16, at 134.
Id.
See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 621.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 621 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714

(1977)).
89
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983). Commercial speech has rested among
First Amendment protections since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
90
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). “In Virginia
Pharmacy, the Supreme Court established that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, though
of a ‘different [lesser] degree’ than noncommercial speech.” Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First
Amendment Constraints on FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 170 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24). After Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, “the Court frequently
struck down restrictions, however, it stopped short of equating commercial speech with fully protected
expression.” Nat Stern & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny for ContentBased Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV., 1171, 1177 (2013).
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the interest of consumer protection, an area that is typically subject to
government regulation.91 Because the commercial speech doctrine promotes
consumer protection, it is considered a listener-based right rather than a
speaker-based right.92 Further, “the right not to speak inheres in political and
commercial speech alike.”93 However, compelled commercial disclosures
afford speakers weaker First Amendment protections.94
The GE labeling law compels speech, thus potentially jeopardizing the
right not to speak. Moreover, the Act rests within in the commercial context.
Therefore, the GE disclosure would be classified as commercial speech.95
Accordingly, the Act would face challenges to compelled commercial
disclosures. But curiously, what makes compelled commercial disclosures
“lighter-touch” regulations also “makes them appear more speechregulating . . . thereby rendering them more susceptible to First Amendment
challenge.”96
B. Surviving First Amendment Challenges May Hinge on the Scrutiny Level
The scrutiny level a reviewing court applies may, ultimately, be outcome
determinative as to whether the GE labeling law withstands First Amendment
challenges. Commercial speech serves narrower interests and is afforded fewer
protections than noncommercial speech, so commercial speech enjoys a lower
level of scrutiny when assessing both the freedom to disclose and compelled
disclosures.97 There are two tests controlling the doctrine of commercial
speech. The Supreme Court established an intermediate scrutiny test in Central
Hudson to determine whether prohibitions on commercial speech violate First
Amendment protections,98 and a less exacting standard in Zauderer.99
Typically, “when ‘regulations compel disclosure without suppressing speech,

91
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 143
(3d ed. 2016). Indeed, the “doctrine was forged as a tool of consumer protection” so the public can make wise
purchasing decisions. Shanor, supra note 16, at 143.
92
Shanor, supra note 16, at 142, 145–46.
93
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 364 (2d ed. 2008).
94
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985).
95
See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 91. Commercial speech has three attributes: (1) the speech
“identifies a specific product,” (2) it “is a form of advertising” designed to attract consumers, and (3) the
speaker may gain economic benefits. Id.
96
Shanor, supra note 16, at 135.
97
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
98
447 U.S. 566, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
99
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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Zauderer, not Central Hudson, provides the standard of review.’”100 However,
if a reviewing court applies Central Hudson instead of Zauderer, it will be
more difficult for the Act to overcome constitutional challenges. The Zauderer
standard is more relaxed than the Central Hudson standard, and “is generally
viewed as being akin to a rational basis standard,”101 although some judges
have noted that the “Zauderer fit requirements are far more stringent than mere
rational basis review.”102 To be sure, as noted by some scholars, the test under
Central Hudson seems to be inapplicable to mandatory disclosures because the
disclosure does not implicate a restriction on commercial speech.103
While the application of the appropriate level of scrutiny may seem clearcut, in practice, courts vacillate between the two standards. This uncertainty
calls for the Supreme Court to clearly categorize the scrutiny levels or,
alternatively, eliminate the dual framework.104
To further complicate predicting the level of scrutiny a reviewing court
will apply, recently the Court has muddled the three traditional levels of
scrutiny—rational basis, intermediate review (or heightened scrutiny), and
strict scrutiny—opting for a “more nuanced approach, rarely following these
formal levels of review,” a stark departure from the “rigidly structured scheme
[that] was widely followed for decades.”105 Recent Supreme Court cases have
applied a stricter construction of rational basis review or have declined entirely
to identify the level of scrutiny, “suggesting that the Court is moving away
from its historical reliance on rigidly defined categories.”106 As noted by
professor and scholar Lawrence Gostin, precise standards afford more
predictability, whereas a more flexible approach allows a sliding-scale
analysis.107 In an adaptive model, “[a]s the intrusiveness and unfairness of a
policy increase, so does the level of judicial scrutiny,” which “reflects a more
100
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 632 (D. Vt. 2015) (quoting Conn. Bar Ass’n v.
United States, 620 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2010)).
101
Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 53, 59 (2016) (first citing N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir.
2009); then citing CITA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(“[C]ircuit courts have essentially characterized the Zauderer test as a rational basis or rational review test.”
(alteration in original)).
102
E.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
103
See, e.g., Berman, supra note 101, at 63. Berman also concludes that “there is no clear way in which
the Central Hudson test can be applied to compelled speech cases.” Id. at 64.
104
See Stern & Stern, supra note 90, at 1172.
105
GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 91, at 147.
106
Id. at 149.
107
Id. at 151.
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fluid balancing of individual interests and collective needs, but its flexibility
comes at the cost of predictability.”108 While a nuanced approach may be more
flexible, it is harder to predict how a reviewing court will respond. An
examination of the two standards will present the considerations of a reviewing
court.
1. The Central Hudson Standard
Many scholars agree that the test under Central Hudson seems to be
inapplicable to mandatory disclosures because the disclosure does not
implicate a restriction on commercial speech.109 Whereas the GE labeling law
involves a compelled disclosure on food product labeling, Central Hudson
involved a ban on advertising electric utilities.110 Under the four-part Central
Hudson analysis, a reviewing court will determine if commercial speech is
protected by the First Amendment by examining whether (1) the speech is
lawful and not misleading, (2) there is a substantial government interest to
justify the government action, (3) the regulation directly advances the
government interest, and (4) the regulation is no more extensive than necessary
to satisfy the interest.111 Although the second prong of the test does not
identify which government interests may be substantial, the requirements are
stricter than the Zauderer standard laid out below.
2. The Zauderer Standard
The Central Hudson standard is appropriate for most restrictions on
commercial speech,112 but mandates on commercial disclosures warrant
weaker First Amendment protections. At issue in Zauderer was whether the
State of Ohio could compel attorneys to disclose certain information on
lawyers’ advertisements.113 Noting that commercial speech protections are
aimed at consumers rather than speakers, the Supreme Court found that the
“interest in not providing any particular factual information . . . is minimal.”114
From Zauderer emerged a test reflecting weaker protections afforded to
speakers when the government mandates commercial speech.
108

Id.
See, e.g., Berman, supra note 101, at 63. Berman concludes that “there is no clear way in which the
Central Hudson test can be applied to compelled speech cases.” Id. at 64.
110
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 558 (1980).
111
Id. at 566.
112
Berman, supra note 101, at 63.
113
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985).
114
Id. at 651.
109
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The Zauderer standard is more relaxed than the Central Hudson standard,
and “is generally viewed as being akin to a rational basis standard.”115 As
succinctly articulated in the concurrence in Zauderer, the standard states that
the “First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech is satisfied so long as
a disclosure requirement is ‘reasonably related’ to preventing consumer
deception.”116 After Zauderer, the standard has been applied to uphold
compelled disclosures—including country-of-origin labels for meats—and
calorie counts and nutrition information for restaurant food.117 Scholar
Amanda Shanor notes, “This sharp asymmetry in the level of scrutiny makes
sense because the constitutional value in commercial speech is that it can
provide information to the public so that the public may make more intelligent
decisions.”118
A compelled disclosure may fail constitutional review under Zauderer if
the requirement is “unjustified” or “unduly burdensome.”119 However,
“unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the
First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”120 Therefore, if
the GE labeling law is overly burdensome, it may be deemed unconstitutional.
Regarding the GE labeling law, the scope of the burden may be contingent
upon the type of disclosure USDA ultimately requires; for example, a QR code
that a consumer must scan on a smartphone or in-store machine that a grocery
store must supply would seemingly be more burdensome on consumers and
retailers than plain-language text. Accordingly, the burden to carry out the
mandatory disclosure would not fall solely on manufacturers, which a
reviewing court should take into consideration.
C. If Courts Continue Applying Stricter Scrutiny, the GE Labeling Law Might
Not Stand
Because the standard of review under Zauderer is more deferential than
Central Hudson, the GE labeling law’s chances at survival may be contingent
upon the scrutiny level a reviewing court applies. To be sure, if the labeling

115

See supra note 101.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117
GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 91, at 145.
118
Shanor, supra note 16, at 147.
119
Zauderer, 741 U.S. at 651 (majority opinion); id. at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
120
Id. at 651 (majority opinion). Indeed, the Court has found that some compelled speech is “as violative
of the First Amendment as prohibitions on speech.” Id. at 650.
116
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disclosure would not pass the Zauderer test, it certainly would not survive
scrutiny under Central Hudson.121
Recent First Amendment jurisprudence has expanded the level of
protection for commercial speech, and recent applications of heightened
scrutiny have made it more difficult for commercial speech regulations to
overcome constitutional review.122 Outside the realm of compelled commercial
disclosures, the recent Supreme Court case Reed v. Town of Gilbert
demonstrates the zenith of expanding commercial speech protections by
subjecting all content-based regulations to strict scrutiny.123 Professor
Genevieve Lakier has forecast that the Reed decision is only the “tip of the
iceberg,” and that “[t]he decision thus demonstrates once again the pronounced
deregulatory tilt of the Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.”124
Although litigants have pushed for the Reed’s strict scrutiny to apply to
commercial speech, lower courts do not seem to be extending the Reed rule to
the commercial speech doctrine.125 But the decision represents a growing trend
toward stricter scrutiny. In conjunction with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.—which applied heightened scrutiny to commercial
speech governance126—the decision in Reed could have further implications on
the commercial speech doctrine.127 Notably, if Reed does apply to commercial
speech, the decision would replace both Central Hudson and Zauderer.128
If this trend continues, opponents to the GE labeling law will likely
demand heightened scrutiny, which may even rise to the breed of intermediate
scrutiny outlined in Central Hudson. Even if a reviewing court applies the
Zauderer standard—which is, in theory, less exacting—the outcome may be
predicated upon the court’s interpretation of the standard; namely, its
interpretation of the requisite government interest to satisfy the government’s
burden.

121
If the Zauderer standard does not apply, the default for a compelled commercial disclosure would be
stricter scrutiny under Central Hudson. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
122
See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 621–22 (D. Vt. 2015).
123
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
124
Genevieve Lakier, Reed v Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First
Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 235–36 (2017).
125
See Lee Mason, Comment, Content Neutrality and Commercial Speech Doctrine After Reed v Town
of Gilbert, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 955, 958 (2017).
126
564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
127
See Mason, supra note 125, at 958.
128
See Shanor, supra note 16, at 179.

BRADY_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

ENFORCING AN UNENFORCEABLE LAW

4/23/2018 12:45 PM

791

The federal GE labeling law is sufficiently similar to the law at issue in
International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy129 to raise doubt as to whether the
Act may override First Amendment protections, despite the fact that compelled
commercial speech is less protected than noncommercial speech.130 In
International Dairy, a Vermont state law required the labeling of dairy
products containing a recombinant version of a hormone called bovine
somatotropin, which presented no verified health risk to consumers because
only trace levels of the hormone transferred to the final product.131 Like in
International Dairy, the federal GE labeling law “indisputably requires
[manufacturers] to speak when they would rather not.”132
Because case law demonstrates both successes and failures to First
Amendment challenges, forecasting whether the GE labeling law will survive
free-speech litigation is uncertain.
Notwithstanding the fact that some litigants argue for stricter scrutiny,133 to
realize a change in standards of constitutional review, courts must grant these
motions for heightened scrutiny. Indeed, courts may be increasingly applying
stricter scrutiny, especially when reviewing public-health regulations.134 If this
trend continues, it is less likely that the federal GE labeling law will withstand
constitutional challenges. In fact, when courts apply intermediate scrutiny
under the Central Hudson standard, First Amendment challenges are often
successful in overturning overly burdensome laws.135
Government interest requirements under each test have also made it more
difficult for the government to meet its burden. Recently, courts have
increasingly required government interests “to have a clear and consistent
policy” with evidence that the regulation will carry out the government
objective and that the method is no more extensive than necessary.136 This is a
marked departure from the deference that courts customarily granted the
129

92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
131
898 F. Supp. 246, 248–49 (D. Vt. 1995). Further, there was no appreciable difference from a
consumer standpoint regarding freshness, taste, nutritional value, or even price, id. at 249, and “neither
consumers nor scientists can distinguish” between the milk produced from cows treated with the recombinant
hormone and cows not treated with the recombinant hormone. Int’l Dairy, 92 F.3d at 73.
132
Int’l Dairy, 92 F.3d at 72.
133
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 621–22 (D. Vt. 2015).
134
See Rauer, supra note 12, at 691; see also Berman, supra note 101, at 54 (explaining that the
Supreme Court has made it more difficult to impose restrictions on commercial advertising, but that mandatory
disclosures of factual information are a more constitutionally viable alternative).
135
Rauer, supra note 12, at 691.
136
GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 91, at 143–44.
130

BRADY_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

792

4/23/2018 12:45 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:771

government in early cases applying the Central Hudson test.137 In addition,
lately there have been efforts to dislodge mandatory disclosures from a
“subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment” protections.138
Moreover, the Supreme Court has yet to review the constitutionality of
mandatory disclosures in the public-health context; indeed, “this area of law is
rife with circuit splits, ambiguous opinions, and unanswered questions that
make it difficult to issue any clear statements about black letter law.”139 Taken
together, it is difficult to predict whether the GE labeling law will overcome
First Amendment challenges. The myriad uncertainties surrounding the
standards make the law ripe for review by the Supreme Court. Because of the
nebulous requirements of both tests, the Supreme Court should clarify the
appropriate scrutiny level—if any specific level should be applied at all—and
the requisite government interests for the government to satisfy its burden. If
the Zauderer standard is, indeed, the appropriate standard in the public-health
arena, the Court should determine whether Zauderer requires a substantial
government interest.

D. After Applying a Three-Factor Analysis, Zauderer Should Be the
Appropriate Standard for Compelled Commercial Disclosures
Implicating Public Health
Zauderer, and its lesser scrutiny, is likely the appropriate standard to
review the GE labeling law because the Act provides for a mandatory
disclosure rather than a restriction on speech. Indeed, all public health
regulations must, at a minimum, meet the rational basis standard, akin to the
Zauderer standard.140 However, in consideration of recent efforts to apply a
Central-Hudson-type scrutiny—with heightened government interest
requirements—to compelled commercial disclosure cases, this prediction is not
fail-safe.141
A reviewing court should apply a three-factor analysis to determine the
appropriate scrutiny level, whether intermediate scrutiny under Central
Hudson or a more relaxed level under Zauderer. In GMA v. Sorrell, the District
Court of Vermont applied a three-factor test142 that examined (1) “whether the

137
138
139
140
141
142

Id.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
Berman, supra note 101, at 54.
GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 91, at 147.
See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015).
Id. at 626.
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compelled speech is ‘commercial’ in nature,” (2) “whether it is purely factual
and not ‘controversial,’” and (3) “whether [the] disclosure requirement is
supported by [an] . . . interest beyond merely satisfying consumer curiosity.”143
If the Supreme Court decides to adopt a formal test to discern the appropriate
scrutiny level for compelled commercial disclosures, the three-part GMA v.
Sorrell test is useful because the test touches upon the important considerations
of a reviewing court. Accordingly, this Comment applies the GMA v. Sorrell
three-part test to conclude that the Zauderer reasonable relationship test is the
appropriate level of scrutiny for the GE labeling disclosure, a conclusion that
hinges upon the fact that the speech at issue is not controversial.
First, like in GMA v. Sorrell, the speech at issue in the federal GE labeling
bill is commercial in nature. Disclosure requirements are akin to other product
labeling requirements, including calorie content on nutrition panels, which “are
traditionally regarded as commercial speech even if they effectively discourage
the product’s consumption.”144 Because it is well settled that mandatory
disclosures fall within the commercial speech context, the first part of the
analysis will not be contentious.
Second, the mandatory speech is not controversial because the label
conveys factual information, even though the disclosure regulates the content
of the manufacturers’ speech.145 Although “the very category of commercial
speech is a context-based category,”146 and courts have recognized that
“virtually all mandatory disclosure requirements regulate content and speakers
in this manner,” the regulations do “not necessarily render them impermissible
viewpoint discrimination.”147 Commercial speech is protected by the First

143
Id. The District Court of Vermont found that the GE labeling law at issue satisfied each of these three
factors, and therefore found that the appropriate level of scrutiny was the reasonable relationship test under
Zauderer. Id. Although both the Central Hudson and Zauderer tests are controlling because they were
promulgated by the Supreme Court, the three-factor test the District Court of Vermont employed is not
controlling precedent. Id.
144
Id. at 627 (citing N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 131, 133 (2d Cir.
2009)). This notion echoes the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
67–68 (1983).
145
See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 624.
146
Shanor, supra note 16, at 151.
147
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 624; see also Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d
294, 316 (1st Cir. 2005) (“So-called ‘compelled speech’ may under modern Supreme Court jurisprudence raise
a serious First Amendment concern where it effects a forced association between the speaker and a particular
viewpoint.”).

BRADY_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

794

4/23/2018 12:45 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:771

Amendment “only to the extent it conveys ‘accurate and reliable’ information
to consumers.”148
Disclosure of factual information, such as the presence of GE ingredients,
does not convey “controversial information.”149 Consequently, the disclosure
requirement in connection with the GE labeling law will not likely be
considered political and thus would not constitute controversial speech to
qualify for broader First Amendment protections—broad enough to warrant
higher scrutiny levels. Moreover, the disclosure would not reflect an opinion
solely “because it compels a speaker to convey information contrary to its
interests.”150 The federal GE labeling law, like the Vermont state law, requires
manufacturers “to speak against their will, regulates the content of that speech,
and identifies the class of speakers who must make it.”151 Accordingly, the GE
disclosure should not be deemed controversial speech by a reviewing court.
Lastly, a reviewing court will determine whether the Act is motivated by
more than consumer curiosity. This factor, specifically, should be clarified by
the Supreme Court, as there is a great deal of uncertainty as to which
government interests are sufficient to meet this requirement. In practice, the
difficulty of reviewing the third factor lies in that courts are unclear as to
whether current jurisprudence has ascribed a substantial interest to the rational
relationship requirement under Zauderer,152 which would heighten the level of
scrutiny. This confusion is compounded by the absence of clear direction from
Congress, which “has not squarely addressed whether materiality pertains only
to safety concerns or whether it also includes consumer interest.”153 In the
issue of food labeling, both consumer safety and consumer interest are of
148

Berman, supra note 101, at 66 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651

(1985)).
149
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 630 (citing Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104,
114 (2d Cir. 2001)).
150
Id. at 629 (citing Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 564 (6th Cir.
2012)).
151
Id. at 624. As noted by Professor Berman, “if this were the standard, every warning or disclosure that
a manufacturer did not want to convey would be ‘controversial.’” Berman, supra note 101, at 70.
152
See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 633 (“As a threshold issue, it is not clear whether
Zauderer requires a state to identify a ‘substantial’ governmental interest before it may require a factual, noncontroversial commercial disclosure,” even though “Zauderer, itself, does not impose this requirement.”).
Some circuits, including the Second Circuit, have required a substantial government interest under the
Zauderer standard for commercial disclosure cases, rather than merely a reasonable relationship. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying the Zauderer standard to disclosures
aimed at better informing consumers even though the disclosure was not the best means of realizing the goal).
However, even courts that have applied this substantial interest standard have not explicitly stated its
requirement under Zauderer. See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 633.
153
Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (D.D.C. 2000).
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significance. Indeed, “[m]ost affirmative labeling obligations are relevant to
health, safety, nutrition or health, and therefore further a ‘substantial
interest,’”154 but because the health concerns underlying GE foods are, to date,
unsubstantiated—or, at best, equivocal155—the government may fail to present
a sufficient interest to satisfy its burden under Central Hudson or Zauderer.
Moreover, currently, it is unsettled whether consumer curiosity, scant scientific
information, and Congress’s aim to preempt fifty sets of disparate state laws
suffice to satisfy the requisite government interest under either Zauderer or
Central Hudson.
At present, it is unclear whether consumer curiosity will satisfy the
government’s burden. Interestingly, mandatory disclosures are often
galvanized by citizen demand.156 Indeed, consumer interest was one of the
motivating factors to the GE labeling law—in both the state and federal
iterations. Accordingly, whether consumer curiosity is a sufficient government
interest will likely be a point of debate once the GE labeling law faces
litigation.
Courts are split as to whether consumer curiosity suffices as a requisite
government interest. In International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, the
Second Circuit held that “consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state
interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual statement.”157
Although the Second Circuit court was sympathetic to consumer concerns, the
motive was insufficient to compel manufacturers to speak against their will and
would open the door to endless disclosure requirements.158 By contrast, the
court in GMA v. Sorrell found that the Vermont GE labeling law could “extend
beyond the mere appeasement of consumer curiosity,” although the court
conceded that the government interests “arguably border” the line.159 To be
sure, the Vermont labeling law was implemented as a consumer protection
rule.160
154

Carver, supra note 90, at 195.
See Consumer Info About GE Food, supra note 17.
156
See Shanor, supra note 16, at 167.
157
92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996).
158
Id.
159
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 631 (D. Vt. 2015). The court cites to the
“scientific debate about the safety of GE ingredients,” as well as environmental impacts and “accommodating
religious beliefs about GE.” Id. Some scholars cite to other governmental interests that might satisfy more than
consumer concern under Zauderer—or even a substantial interest under Central Hudson. See Stephen Tan &
Brian Epley, Much Ado About Something: The First Amendment and Mandatory Labeling of Genetically
Engineered Foods, 89 WASH. L. REV. 301, 315–27 (2014) (citing environmental, economic, social, and
cultural impacts of GE farming to be substantial interests that would overcome First Amendment concerns).
160
Vt. Consumer Protection R. § 121 (2016).
155

BRADY_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

796

4/23/2018 12:45 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:771

While consumer concerns may seem less urgent than public health, courts
have regarded consumer concerns as sufficient government interests to uphold
product labeling. In American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, the D.C. Circuit found a sufficient government interest in countryof-origin labels for meat because the law allowed consumers to “make
informed choices based on characteristics of the products they wished to
purchase” even though the law did not involve any ostensible consumer
deception.161 Here, the GE labeling law may withstand First Amendment
challenges if a reviewing court finds that the mandatory disclosure is
“reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of
consumers.”162 Notably, to date, all compelled commercial speech cases
reviewed by the Supreme Court have involved consumer deception,163 and
consumer litigation against food manufacturers often cites false and misleading
labels.
Whereas the Vermont GE labeling law details government interests in the
“Findings” and “Purpose” sections of the Vermont state law,164 the federal Act
does not contain a “Findings” or “Purpose” section to justify its enactment.165
There was some discussion in the Congressional Record regarding the safety
of GE foods, but most of the legislative history suggests the driving force
behind the Act was to preempt patchwork state laws.166
A troubling concern is that absent Congress’s direction, courts must
intervene to determine the indistinct line between “satisfying consumer
curiosity” and substantial government interests.167 Consequently, this entitles
courts “the role of a scientific review committee, second-guessing legislative
decisions.”168 However, without judicial review, government restrictions like
this compelled disclosure could go unchecked.

161

760 F.3d 18, 24–25 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
163
Berman, supra note 101, at 75.
164
2014 Vt. Acts & Resolves 346. The court in GMA v. Sorrell stated that if the Zauderer requirement
did, indeed, impose a substantial interest on the part of the government, that the “Findings” and “Purpose”
would exhibit a substantial government interest. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 633–34.
165
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1639, 1639a–c, 1639i–j, 6524 (Supp.
2018).
166
See, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. H4935 (daily ed. July 14, 2016) (statement of Rep. Peterson) (“This
legislation is needed to avoid a situation where 50 [s]tates set up 50 different labels, which would only create
confusion for consumers, farmers, and food companies.”).
167
Berman, supra note 101, at 76.
168
Id.
162
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Consumer interest does not always equate with improved consumer safety.
Indeed, the effectiveness of mandatory warnings in the public health context
on other products is equivocal, which cuts against the argument that the
mandatory GE label has a sufficient government interest in the protection of
the health of consumers. For example, calorie disclosures, which have been
mandatory in New York City since 2008 (and will soon be required of chain
restaurants throughout the United States), have had minimal, if any, impact on
the choices of consumers.169
Once the Act is challenged, the government will likely posit that its interest
is to prevent consumer deception and to block patchwork state laws.170 In favor
of satisfying the government interest requirement, the Supreme Court has
suggested that “compelled disclosures are preferable to restrictions on
speech—even when consumer deception is not involved.”171 As seen in R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Administration,172 the D.C. Circuit
Court concluded that the Zauderer standard is appropriate “when the
government affirmatively demonstrates that an advertisement threatens to
deceive consumers.”173 However, this argument may be weaker regarding the
federal GE labeling law as the disclosure would not compromise consumer
health if a consumer chooses one product that bears the disclosure over a
product that does not. The consumer deception argument is rooted in the idea
“that consumers should assign significance to the fact that a product contains
an ingredient derived from a genetically engineered plant.”174 But if there is no
consumer deception involved based on a credible health claim, this
consideration may weigh in favor of GE labeling law opponents. Under

169
Id. at 56. The ineffectiveness of some mandatory disclosures may be rooted in the fact that the burden
of changing behavior shifts to the consumer receiving the message. Id. at 57.
170
Zauderer has made clear that disclosure need not be necessary to fulfill the government interest, as
would be required under the strict scrutiny “least restrictive means” requirement. Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985).
171
Berman, supra note 101, at 73–74. (explaining that “the Central Hudson framework relies heavily on
the supposition that ‘more speech’ (i.e., required disclosures) is preferable to restrictions on speech,
whether . . . the governmental interest at stake involves countering consumer deception”).
172
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v.
USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
173
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1214. Although the disclosure in R.J. Reynolds was a graphic
image, there were also doubts as to whether the image conveyed “‘purely factual and uncontroversial’
information.” Id. at 1216 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). Although USDA has yet to determine the form
of the disclosure, the format will likely be a text or symbol rather than a graphic image. National
Bioengineered Disclosure Standard, 7 U.S.C. § 1639b(b)(2)(D) (Supp. 2018) (proposing USDA implement a
disclosure by text, symbol, or link).
174
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 621 (D. Vt. 2015) (quoting Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, Doc. 37-1 at 14 ¶ 43).
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Zauderer, the government interest “may be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”175 Despite this lesser standard,
there are still doubts as to whether the meager scientific data claiming that GEs
pose certain health risks would satisfy the government interest under Zauderer
to overcome constitutional challenges.
Therefore, the government’s best tactic to overcome the government
interest requirement is to highlight the detriment to manufacturers and
consumers in allowing patchwork state laws in the absence of a federal law.
Federal preemption of state laws supports the interests of both manufacturers
and consumers by preventing each state from adopting GE labeling laws with
disparate standards.176
In the interest of manufacturers, if a company had to create tailor-made
labels for certain states, labeling could be prohibitively expensive, especially if
several states have conflicting requirements. To cover costs, the manufacturer
may then transfer the price increase to consumers. Discussing the interest of
consumer protection, the Congressional Record notes the benefits of a federal
regulatory scheme and the dangers of patchwork labeling laws. Senator
McConnell stated the GE labeling law “would protect middle-class families
from unnecessary and unfair higher food prices that could result from a
patchwork of [s]tate food labeling laws.”177 Addressing disparate state laws,
Chairman Conaway indicated that “some [s]tates have begun to implement
arbitrary and inconsistent labeling laws that threaten to increase consumer
confusion and food costs while ultimately interfering with interstate
commerce.”178 Both of these government interests, individually or together,
could pass rational basis scrutiny under Zauderer.
IV. TWO TYPES OF PRIVATE LITIGATION WILL BE NECESSARY
TO ENFORCE THE GE LABELING LAW
Assuming the federal GE labeling law withstands First Amendment
challenges, the weak enforcement provision implores that private litigation aid
to enforce the Act. Two types of litigation may prove to be valuable
enforcement tools. First, this Part explores a new wave of consumer litigation
175

Berman, supra note 101, at 59 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
162 CONG. REC. H4935 (daily ed. July 14, 2016) (statement of Rep. Peterson).
177
162 CONG. REC. S4778 (daily ed. July 6, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell). But see 162 CONG.
REC. S4787 (daily ed. July 6, 2016) (statement of Sen. Tester) (“This is completely ridiculous, a nightmare for
consumers, and an illusion of transparency.”).
178
162 CONG. REC. H4934 (daily ed. July 14, 2016) (statement of Rep. Conaway).
176
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that will likely follow in the same vein as current consumer class action suits
arising from voluntary disclosure of GE products. Second, this Part discusses a
new trend in competitor suits arising under the Lanham Act, which may be a
promising way for competitors to enforce the GE labeling law absent
persuasive enforcement in the Act. Both consumer litigation and Lanham Act
suits may “fill [the] regulatory void” left by federal administrative agencies.179
A. Consumer Litigation Will Be a Useful Enforcement Tool
To enforce the Act, consumers will likely file class actions that will follow
the footsteps of scads of existing litigation arising from voluntary GE labels.180
The presence of a mandatory labeling scheme will not likely preclude suits
from consumers, just as the implementation of the federal organic program has
not stopped consumer litigation of misleading labels.181 This section examines
the current landscape of consumer class actions in the food labeling industry,
and addresses hurdles to consumer redress that may pave the way for
competitor suits to become a more powerful enforcement tool than consumer
class actions.
Cases involving food products, including GE labeling, are prevalent in
consumer class-action litigation.182 Within the practice of class-action
litigation, the subset of consumer class actions serves to represent users of
products and services for claims arising under consumer and securities fraud,
products liability, and employment discrimination,183 especially prevalent in
the areas of “insurance, healthcare, data privacy, antitrust, and retail
products.”184 Most states have consumer protection laws that provide a right of
action to injured consumers; the majority of these states permit consumers to
aggregate their claims through the class action model.185 In the context of food
179
Hilary G. Buttrick & Courtney Droms Hatch, Pomegranate Juice Can Do THAT? Navigating the
Jurisdictional Landscape of Food Health Claim Regulation in a Post-POM Wonderful World, 49 IND. L. REV.
267, 268 (2016).
180
See, e.g., Gallagher v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 15-cv-03952-HSG, 2016 WL 454083 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 5, 2016); Garcia v. Kashi Co., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2014); Pappas v. Naked Juice Co., No.
CV 11-8276-JAK, 2012 WL 12248744 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2012).
181
See, e.g., ASHLEY HARRISON ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND CASE UPDATES
IN FOOD LABELING CLASS ACTIONS AND ADVERTISING LITIGATION (2015).
182
Id.
183
Paul G. Karlsgodt & Dustin M. Dow, The Practical Approach: How the Roberts Court Has
Enhanced Class Action Procedure by Strategically Carving at the Edges, 48 AKRON L. REV. 883, 896–97
(2015).
184
Id. at 897.
185
Michael Isaac Miller, Comment, The Class Action (Un)Fairness Act of 2005: Could It Spell the End
of the Multi-State Consumer Class Action?, 36 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 879, 891 (2009).
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labeling, lawsuits typically claim misleading or deceptive labeling and false
advertising.186 Specific claims may include, for example, “violation of state
consumer protection laws, breach of express warranty, breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability, and unjust enrichment.”187
Recent class action cases have had a mixed track record for plaintiffs and
defendants. These mixed yet moderate success rates for both plaintiffs and
defendants hinge on the class certification stage.188 An example of a successful
plaintiff is the case Garcia v. Kashi Co., in which a class of plaintiffs alleged
that the presence of GMOs on a product with “all natural” labeling was
deceptive and misleading to a reasonable consumer.189 The Southern District of
Florida denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the complaint
“sufficiently alleges that a reasonable consumer would expect a product
labeled ‘all natural’ to be free of GMOs.”190 In contrast, defendants have also
been successful. In In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., the court denied class
certification in a case concerning cooking oil labeled as “100% Natural”
despite the presence of GE ingredients.191 Because plaintiffs have garnered
some success, consumers continue to seek redress for their food labeling
grievances, so it may be presumed that this trend will continue with the federal
mandatory GE disclosure as the subject of litigation.
However, there are certain types of cases in which plaintiffs may be more
successful. Statistically, plaintiffs more often succeed in claims for false or
misleading advertising rather than false health claims because defendants more
often prevail in moving to dismiss health claim cases.192 Before reaching the
merits, significant hurdles to plaintiffs, for both health and nonhealth claims,
frequently arrive at the class certification stage, when courts often deny
putative classes based on a lack of ascertainability.193
Despite these barriers, consumers will likely challenge the GE labeling
law, as they do in many other labeling grievances, but they will seek redress in
state courts. The Act affords no private right of action to individual consumers,

186

See generally HARRISON ET AL., supra note 181 (canvassing class-action lawsuits).
In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 537, 547 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
188
Id.
189
43 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
190
Id. at 1385. Although the Southern District of Florida denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss in
Garcia v. Kashi, Co., defendants may have more success as the pleadings stage. See HARRISON ET AL., supra
note 181, at 8–9.
191
302 F.R.D. at 547, 581.
192
HARRISON ET AL., supra at note 181, at 2, 8.
193
Id. at 10, 14.
187
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so litigation will arise under state laws, either through parallel state GE
labeling laws as recommended by Congress194—provided the parallel laws
afford a private right of action—or through existing consumer-protection
laws,195 such as California’s False Advertising Law under California’s Unfair
Competition Law (UCL)196 or California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act.197
Certainly, state consumer protection laws may prove to be effective
enforcement tools: they often allow for private rights of action and grant state
attorneys general leeway to bring enforcement actions against manufacturers
for unfair or deceptive trade practices.198 Consumers may also seek redress
through “breach of warranty or common law fraud claims.”199 Either channel is
consistent with recent trends in class-action litigation.200
Through either proprietary state GE labeling laws or state consumerprotection laws, consumers will likely initiate class-action lawsuits because the
amounts in controversy of actual consumer injury will not reflect values worth
litigating individual lawsuits.201 Litigating individual injuries separately is not
a wise method of redress because the cost of litigation will far outweigh the
value of the product.202 Consequently, “[w]here recovery on an individual
basis would be dwarfed by the cost of litigating on an individual basis, this
factor weighs in favor of class certification.”203

194

National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, 7 U.S.C. § 1639b(e) (Supp. 2018).
See, e.g., In re POM Wonderful LLC Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. ML 10-02199 DDP, 2012
WL 4490860 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012).
196
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2012). “The UCL was enacted to protect citizens against
‘unlawful,’ ‘unfair,’ and ‘fraudulent’ business activities, including false advertising.” HILARY HEHMAN,
OFFICE OF COURT RESEARCH, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, FINDINGS OF THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION, 2000–2006: FIRST INTERIM REPORT 8 (2009). Because of the UCL’s relatively lax
standing requirements that did not compel plaintiffs to “demonstrate actual harm or seek formal class
certification for the representative action,” plaintiffs cited the UCL in 45.6% of business tort cases in the study.
Id. at 8–9.
197
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 (West 2009).
198
GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 91, at 503.
199
Buttrick & Hatch, supra note 179, at 279 (citing NICOLE E. NEGOWETTI, GOVERNANCE STUDIES
BROOKINGS INST., FOOD LABELING LITIGATION: EXPOSING GAPS IN THE FDA’S RESOURCES AND REGULATORY
AUTHORITY 11 (2014)).
200
HEHMAN, supra note 196, at 4 (“The number of class action cases filed from 2000 to 2005 increased
in contrast to the total unlimited civil filings trend during the same period, which shows an overall decrease.”).
201
See, e.g., In re POM Wonderful LLC Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. ML 10-02199 DDP, 2012
WL 4490860 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012). Usually, “[t]he most compelling rationale for finding superiority in a
class action” is “the existence of a negative value suit.” Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co. 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th
Cir. 1996).
202
POM Wonderful, 2012 WL 4490860, at *6 (citing Johnson v. General Mills, Inc., 275 F.R.D. 282,
289 (C.D. Cal. 2011)).
203
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175
(9th Cir. 2010)).
195
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While consumer class actions will likely endure, the continued use of
coupon settlements in class actions may elevate competitor suits as a superior
method of enforcement. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)204
expanded federal jurisdiction for interstate class actions and attempted to curb
coupon settlements,205 but did not rule out entirely the possibility of coupon
settlements for class-action litigation.206 In fact, CAFA may have had little to
no effect on coupon settlements and the tendency for plaintiffs’ attorneys to
boost their fees.207 Most notably, some federal courts that have addressed this
issue have concluded CAFA’s provisions on coupon settlements are no more
restrictive than the traditional requirements under Rule 23(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, governing “fairness, reasonableness, and
adequacy,”208 despite CAFA’s additional procedural requirement.209 While
some federal courts have explicitly addressed the issue,210 other courts have
implicitly adopted the same standard as Rule 23(e).211
In the context of food-labeling litigation, federal courts have applied the
same standard as Rule 23(e) even after the enactment of CAFA. In In re Tyson
Foods, a class of consumer plaintiffs alleged that the product was false and
misleading, and coupons were part of the relief,212 yet there was no mention of
a different standard under CAFA than under Rule 23(e), thus implicitly
adopting the Rule 23(e) standard.213 On the contrary, some federal courts have
applied stricter standards after CAFA.214 Although state courts do not need to
honor CAFA or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are applicable in
federal courts, some courts look to CAFA for guidance, especially courts that
have recognized “how ‘mainstream’ the concern with coupon settlements has
become.”215 Both state and federal courts may continue to grant coupon
settlements. Even if a settlement has the effect of enforcing the GE labeling
204

28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012).
Id. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1712.
206
Michael W. Davis et al., Coupon Settlements Play Continuing Role in Class Action Litigation After
CAFA, 13 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 811 (2012).
207
See id.
208
Id. at 813.
209
28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2012) (requiring a hearing and “making a written finding that[] the settlement is
fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members”).
210
See e.g., Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The ‘fair, reasonable,
and adequate’ standard imposed by CAFA is identical to the language in Rule 23(e) . . . .”).
211
Davis et al., supra note 206, at 812–13.
212
In re Tyson Foods Inc., No. RDB-08-1982, 2010 WL 1924012, at *1, 3 (D. Md. May 11, 2010).
213
See Davis et al., supra note 206, at 813.
214
See, e.g., id.
215
Id. at 814 (quoting In re Mass. Smokeless Tobacco Litig., No. 03-5038-BLS I, 2008 BL 106204
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 09, 2008)).
205

BRADY_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

4/23/2018 12:45 PM

ENFORCING AN UNENFORCEABLE LAW

803

law, plaintiffs’ attorneys will still be enriched far more than a token coupon
may provide redress to consumers.216 In addition, consumer litigation can
tarnish an infringing manufacturer’s reputation in the consumer marketplace,217
which may compel manufacturers into compliance. Consequently, although
consumer litigation does not serve to make injured consumers whole, it will
likely remain a valuable enforcement tool. However, consumer litigation alone
may be insufficient. Although litigation from competitors under the Lanham
Act may not provide consumers redress apart from actual enforcement of the
law, damages resulting from Lanham Act cases would serve to make lawabiding competitors whole rather than class-action attorneys. This may lead
competitor suits to be the most promising enforcement tool to effect
compliance with the GE labeling law.
B. Competitor Suits Under the Lanham Act Will Be the Most Effective
Enforcement Tool
Due to the lack of enforcement provisions within the Act itself, competitors
hoping for compliance cannot rely solely on the federal government for
enforcement. In other disputes in the food industry, competitors have,
creatively, been successful litigating under the Lanham Act. The Supreme
Court’s decision in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Co. (POM
Wonderful)218 paved the way for competitor suits to be a viable enforcement
tool.219 This landmark decision “altered the landscape for both food and
beverage manufacturers and consumers,”220 and since then there has been a
host of cases by competitors under the Lanham Act seeking to enforce foodlabeling violations.221

216

28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012).
Andrea M. Pezzullo, Note, The Crusade Against Misleading Labels: Are Manufacturers the
Protectors of Consumer Interests?, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 323, 342 (2016).
218
134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
219
See Pezzullo, supra note 217, at 333, 337 (“Many food, beverage, and drug manufacturers [have]
brought claims under the Lanham Act to combat their competitors’ false labeling.”).
220
Id. (citing Mary LeFrance, LeFrance on Federal False Advertising Claims Arising from FDAComplaint Labels: POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 2014 EMERGING ISSUES 7211 (2014)).
221
See, e.g., ThermoLife Int’l., LLC v. Gaspari Nutrition Inc., 648 F. App’x 609 (9th Cir. 2016); Me.
Springs, LLC v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00321-GZS (D. Me. Nov. 2, 2015),
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Singal/2015/GZS_11022015_2-14cv321_Maine_Springs_v_Nestle_
Waters.pdf; Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Conopco, Inc.
v. Hampton Creek, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-06856-WHW-CLW (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.coatsandbennett.
com/images/pdf/motion-for-PI.pdf; Complaint, Global Beverage Enters. Inc. v. Cytosport, Inc., No. 0:14-cv60950-JIC (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2014).
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The holding in POM Wonderful allowed a litigation gap through which
product manufacturers can sue one another for unfair competition under the
Lanham Act.222 The Lanham Act creates a private right of action for
competitors, but not individual consumers.223 Until this ruling, it was unclear
whether FDA’s primary jurisdiction would preclude suits by competitors.224 In
this case, POM Wonderful sued Coca-Cola because the latter extolled the
antioxidant virtues of its pomegranate-blueberry juice blend when the product
was mostly a blend of apple and grape juices.225 POM Wonderful alleged that
Coca-Cola duped customers into buying the Coca-Cola product and that POM
Wonderful was injured as a competitor.226
Procedurally, to enforce the GE labeling law, competitors will need to sue
to enforce the Lanham Act, not the federal GE labeling law.227 The Lanham
Act allows a competitor to challenge misleading product descriptions, even if
the labeling complies with the requirements of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA).228 The POM Wonderful Court noted the “intersection and
complementarity of these two federal laws,” and concluded that they do not
conflict. 229 Accordingly, USDA will devise and implement the GE labeling
law’s regulations, but product labeling remains within the purview of FDA,230
so the FDCA may still be the complementary law working in conjunction with
the Lanham Act. Moreover, the Court noted that, in general, “‘Congress did
not intend [federal] oversight to be the exclusive means’ of ensuring proper
food and beverage labeling,”231 and that “FDCA’s delegation of enforcement
authority to the Federal Government does not indicate that Congress intended
to foreclose private enforcement of other federal statutes.”232 Accordingly,

222

15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2234.
224
See id. at 2233; Buttrick & Hatch, supra note 179, at 281.
225
POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2233.
226
Id. at 2235.
227
See, e.g., id. at 2238.
228
Id. at 2233; see also Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C §§ 301–399(f) (2012).
229
POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2233. The Court discussed that the two statutes have coexisted since
1946 and if Congress considered “that Lanham Act suits could interfere with the FDCA, it might well have
enacted a provision addressing the issue during these 70 years,” especially because Congress had included
express preemption provisions in other amendments to both acts. Id. at 2237. Moreover, the Court concluded,
“When two statutes complement each other, it would show disregard for the congressional design to hold that
Congress nonetheless intended one federal statute to preclude the operation of the other.” Id. at 2238 (citing
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001)).
230
21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2012).
231
POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2237 (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009)).
232
Id. at 2232.
223
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private competitor enforcement fits comfortably within congressional intent of
the regulation of food and beverage labeling.
In connection with the GE labeling law, Congress intended that states enact
their own GE labeling provisions by declining to include an enforcement
provision in the Act with any real teeth,233 and by explaining that state-labeling
requirements must be identical to the federal statute.234 The text of the Lanham
Act permits suit against anyone who “misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin” of products or services.235 Each of these factors
may be implicated in the context of GE labeling law. Grievances may include
that the product is derived from GE ingredients but not labeled as such—
constituting false advertising under the Lanham Act through “false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact.”236
There will be two likely incentives for companies to sue one another:
(1) absence of mandatory labeling on products that contain GE materials in
contravention of the law and (2) false and misleading representations that
products with or without GE materials are healthier. To explain the second
reason, the presence or absence of the GE disclosure necessarily implicates
“that consumers should assign significance to the fact that a product contains
an ingredient derived from a genetically engineered plant.”237 Both claims
would target labels that “misrepresent[] the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin” of the products.238
These competitor lawsuits will claim both monetary and injunctive relief as
provided in § 35 of the Lanham Act, allowing for recovery of defendant’s
profits, plaintiff’s damages, and costs of the lawsuit.239 Relief through the
Lanham Act could prove to have a dual effect: seek redress for the injured
manufacturer and incentivize the infringing product manufacturer to comply
with the GE labeling law.

233

See National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, 7 U.S.C. § 1639b(g) (Supp. 2018).
Id. §§ 1639b(e), 1639i.
235
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012).
236
Id. § 1125(a)(1).
237
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 621 (D. Vt. 2015) (quoting Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, Doc. 37-1 at 14 ¶ 43).
238
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
239
Id. § 1117(a).
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The federal GE labeling law is devoid of any civil penalties or true
mechanics of enforcement,240 so litigation under the Lanham Act may be a
necessary and valuable compliance tool. If competitors become the major
players, there may be ideological issues with whether private parties should
bear the burden of litigating to enforce federal laws. However, as the Supreme
Court noted in POM Wonderful, federal agencies such as FDA do “not have
the same perspective or expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day
competitors possess,”241 which led the Court to find that competitors are better
positioned to be aware of unfair marketing practices.
Some reactions to POM Wonderful applaud the “integrated regulation” of
private efforts that augment enforcement of federal regulations; for example,
some scholars have noted that the “Lanham Act suits will fill the regulatory
gaps left by inadequate . . . regulation”242 because FDA’s enforcement is
discretionary.243 Other scholars argue that Lanham Act suits are an insufficient
solution to fill the regulatory void.244 An alternative solution proposes that
Congress grant a private right of action in the FDCA for individual consumers
to sue manufacturers.245 This solution would be unwieldy, and Congress has
also addressed the issue of complementary federal and private enforcement,246
so it may be unlikely that Congress would pass a law to the contrary.
Enforcement through the Lanham Act, however, utilizes provisions already
approved by Congress, and enforcement could start when necessary rather than
waiting for Congress to pass another law.
Due to the myriad hurdles involved in certifying consumer class actions,
and the unpredictability and mixed success of recent consumer class action
cases, competitor suits may provide the best private enforcement of the GE
labeling law. POM Wonderful has paved a way in which competitors may
240

7 U.S.C. § 1639b(g) (Supp. 2018).
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014). The Court characterized this
type of enforcement as “synergies among multiple methods of regulation.” Id. at 2239.
242
Jennifer Thurswell Radis, Note, The Lanham Act’s Wonderful Complement to the FDCA: POM
Wonderful v. Coca-Cola Enhances Protection Against Misleading Labeling Through Integrated Regulation,
47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 435 (2015).
243
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (finding that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute
or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s
absolute discretion”). Much of FDA’s discretion is imposed externally by financial constraints, and its
resources “do not match the breadth of its responsibilities.” Pezzullo, supra note 217, at 338.
244
See, e.g., Pezzullo, supra note 217, at 340–41.
245
See, e.g., id. at 341 (citing James Springer, Note, The Success of the Citizen Suit: Protecting
Consumers from Inaccurate Food Labeling by Amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 68 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 401 (2013)).
246
See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2233.
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serve as a necessary complement to federal enforcement to ensure compliance
with the GE labeling law.
CONCLUSION
Review of the GE labeling law likely will fall under the Zauderer
reasonable relationship standard. Even under this more relaxed standard of
review, there stand doubts as to whether the disclosure requirement will
survive First Amendment constitutional review absent a sufficient government
interest—especially because consumer curiosity alone will not likely satisfy
the Zauderer standard.
Assuming the GE labeling law withstands First Amendment challenges,
states will need to enact parallel laws to deter frivolous consumer class actions
that inundate courts. In addition, due to the Act’s extremely weak enforcement
provisions, private enforcement will be necessary to enforce the GE labeling
law. Although consumer class actions could prove to be effective, their mixed
success opens the door for alternative methods of private enforcement of the
GE labeling law. Accordingly, the most promising enforcement tool will come
from manufacturers seeking to enforce compliance under the Lanham Act.
MARY CHRISTINE BRADY∗

∗
Executive Managing Editor, Emory Law Journal, Volume 67; Emory University School of Law, J.D.,
2018; Davidson College, B.A., 2009. Sincerest thanks to my Comment advisor, Professor Richard Freer, for
his unwavering encouragement throughout the writing process despite my picking an obscure topic. Professor
William Kitchens, your class inspired me to write this Comment, and I would like to thank you for your
valuable insight, guidance, and feedback. I would also like to thank the members of the Emory Law Journal
Executive Board for their hard work and dedication. And, most importantly, thank you to my family (and
Colby, Ellie, and Sage) for your unconditional and boundless love and support.

